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AIRSPACE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS
AFFECTED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATIONt
"I cannot exercise my rights in such a way as to
infringe the law or the rights of others." Markby.
Both the occupant of land and the aviator have rights to
the use of the earth's superjacent airspace, and it is the
problem of adjusting these rights that besieges modern law.
The resolution of the conflicting claims by these two interests
is present-day law in the making, but it may be based on
established and fundamental concepts if one accepts the
theory that the right to the peaceful use of land is accorded
every land-owner as an "average" man, without unusual
sensitivities or nervousness, and who does not use his land
to the deliberate harm or annoyance of others or contrary to
the law. Similarly, an aviator has a right to peaceful use of
airspace so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of
landowners or violate the law.
Airspace rights-and liabilities resulting from an invasion
of them-arise only under legal systems which recognize
proprietary rights in immovables. However, a large part of
the law which recognizes airspace rights can be also based on
the rights of freedom from invasion of the person or personal
property as protected by tort actions.' Refinements of legal
rights and social interests, however, cannot be based com-
pletely on personal grounds, so that a theory of the owner-
ship of airspace has developed which generally attaches to
the property interests in the surface of the land.
tThis is the first of two installments of this article. The second, which will
discuss Rights and Liabilities Respecting Aircraft Flight Other Than Landing
and Taking Off; Airspace Rights as Affected by Proximity to Airports; and
Government Control and Regulation of Certain Airspace Rights, will appear in
the Fall Issue of Volume XXVII of the Notre Dame Lawyer. [Editor's note.]
1 These actions normally would be based on trespass to the person or trespass
to personalty.
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Unenclosed air, of course, is too shifting and uncontrol-
lable to be deemed specific property so it naturally came to
be conceived of as the common property of all men as soon
as the law was faced with tonflicting interests in airspace.'
It is noteworthy that the law of elementary civilizations,
such as the Code of Hammurabi and the Visogothic Code,
made no reference either to air or airspace property rights.
In order to understand the various rights in airspace, the
term must be defined. For purposes of this discussion it is
the volume of space above a given land surface, bounded by
the land as a base of an inverted truncated pyramid, with
the side boundaries limited by radii from the center of the
earth along the peripheral area of the land surface and ex-
tending indefinitely outwardly above the land. Generally,
this may be thought of as the volume of space extending sky-
ward above a specific area of land. Since this space is neces-
sarily a volume which requires a tangible reference unit, it
is conveniently given a reference in relation to the land base.
From the land base concept various definitions and maxims
of "land" in its legal scope have been devised. Early defini-
tions declare that property rights in land are indefinite and
extend to the center of the earth and to infinity in the ex-
ternal space above it. 3 It is evident that such an elementary
delimitation of property in the land surface owner was not
developed by a realistic appraisal of past and prospective
human endeavor; it neither takes into account the fact that
theretofore activities were not conducted either far above
.2 Bouve, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 AaR L. Rav. 232 (1930); Lardone,
Airspace Rights in Roman Law, 2 Am L. Ray. 455 (1931); Sweeney, Adjusting
the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J.
AIR L. 329 (1932).
Bouve, suPra at 235, interprets Blackstone as holding that property in air is
common ". . unless and until it is occupied by someone, when a usufructuary
property approximating complete ownership during the time of occupancy re-
sults. . . . ,But, where abandoned, such airtracts are said to return to the 'com-
mon stock.'"
3 In Isham v. Morgan, 9 Conn. 374, 377 (1832), the court said: "The word
land . . . in its legal signification . . . also has an indefinite extent upwards,
as well as downwards.. .. "
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or below the surface of the earth, and at the same time it un-
duly inhibits future activities at any distance from the sur-
face.
Various rules of law were evolved with the increased use
of airspace, both in the higher and lower strata. These rules
had to be subordinated to and in aid of the basic principle
of all creation, as contained in natural law and divinely re-
vealed: '
Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him
have dominion over . . . the whole earth, . . .
And God created man to His own image....
And God blessed them, saying: . . . fill the earth, and
subdue it....
In subduing and obtaining dominion over the whole earth,
man has delved into its interior and probed surrounding
space. Neither of these penetrations has been too great by
actual physical human traverse, but technological advances
through the ages have given man progressively more do-
minion over the earth. The law has adapted itself to the
changing circumstances, and the penetrations of subjacent
landspace by wells, pits, and mines, and of superjacent air-
space by a variety of stationary and movable structures, ob-
jects, forces, and disturbances have resulted in ever new
facets of legal rules applicable to these changed conditions.
Similarly, the questions of sovereignty in airspace are rela-
tively new and are being determined by international con-
ventions, treaties, and declarations of national and state
policies. Many attempts have been made to simulate the
rights of sovereignty in airspace to those of the sea, but these
latter refer to a relatively simple subject having, until re-
cently, only a two dimensional quality for purposes of tra-
verse, as compared to the three dimensional use of airspace.
The development of a separate law for aeronautics is now
4 Genesis, 1:26, 27, 28.
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admitted as desirable,5 with the application, as far as pos-
sible, of the accepted basic rules of contract, tort, and crime
to it.
The infringement of airspace rights is of two general types,
actual physical penetration into the space by a tangible ob-
ject, and penetration by a form of energy or by a force gen-
erated or set in motion external to the area invaded. The
former may be either relatively permanent or transient. It
may be an appropriation of a portion of the space by a rela-
tively permanent volumetric displacement or enclosure of it,
as by tree branches, part of a building, wires or other fixtures
secured to the land, which are continuing invasions of the
airspace. Or, it may be but a transitory "use" which causes
the displacement of the airspace, such as by the flight of
goshawks, the passing of projectiles from guns or other
sources of projection, the passage of dust, sand, or smoke,
the release and transit of fetid atmosphere or noisome gases,
germicides, or insecticides, or the flight of aircraft. The
second type of infringement is the penetration of the air-
space by invisible forces or energy,' such as sound vibrations
or concussion, thermic variations, electromagnetic disturb-
ances, and light. The comparatively rapid dissipation of
these latter types of invasion usually precludes recovery by
the airspace "owner" unless the invasion is unreasonable or
carelessly propagated, or unless its recurrence tends to make
it unreasonable in its continuity or effects. Both types of
airspace trespass-nuisance situations had been litigated long
before the excursions of man into the atmosphere. The
flight of aircraft and the effects of forces and energy propa-
5 Evidence of the fact that a distinct air law is desirable can be found in the
numerous international conventions which have been held to frame, if possible,
an international aviation law. In this country, aviation law is generally regarded
as a matter for state jurisdiction, although a limited area of federal regulation
has been defined by the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 568 et seq. (1926),
as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 171 et seq. (1946), 49 U. S. C. §§ 175 et seq. (Supp.
1950), and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 977 et seq. (1938), as
amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 401 et seq. (1946), 49 U. S. C. §§ 401 et seq. (Supp.
1950).
6 Sweeney, The Airport as a Nuisance, 4 J. Am L. 330, 338 (1933).
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gated by it in operation have, however, accentuated certain
aspects of the already existent problems.
It is, therefore, important to distinguish rules of law from
general maxims which are not law, but which by force of rep-
etition have been raised to the stature of rebuttable pre-
sumptions.7 Legal problems arise from the operation of air-
craft in four general types of situations: (1) flights of air-
craft other than taking-off and landing; (2) taking-off and
landing of aircraft; (3) invasions of airspace by airport op-
eration apart from specific flights by aircraft; and (4) ob-
structions to aviation by projections into airspace by land-
owners.8 Remedies relevant are trespass, ejectment, and
nuisance, the application of which can best be understood by
a brief resume of the historical development of the law of
airspace rights prior to the era of air navigation.
I.
Early Historical Development of Airspace Rights
To present an adequate picture of the present state of the
law of airspace, its evolution must be thoroughly traced.'
The purpose for the historical study is twofold. It promotes
an understanding of contemporary law 10 and it eliminates
7 LUlPTON, CIvILAvIATIoN LAW §§ 37-46 (1935).
8 This problem is discussed by Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests
of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. Am L. 329 (1932), where
he classifies five situations, which are slightly different from these and include other
than airspace rights.
9 POUND, INTER'RETATIONS oF LEGAL HISTORY 19 (1923), gives an excellent
reason for reflection in the use of such material. He says in part: "For when
we look at the rules or the decisions or the texts of the past, through a rational-
ized medium of legal analysis and system, in a different setting from that in
which they took form and were applied, we look at them for the purposes of
present problems and with the ideas and the setting of the present before us. It
by no means follows that what we see thus through the spectacles of the present
is anything that was applied actually to the decision of causes anywhere or at
any time. It is more likely to be an idealized reflection upon the legal problems
of the present in terms of the texts of the past."
10 Id. at 7, where Pound quotes GAruS, LAW OF THE TwELv TABis 1,
Digest 1,2, 1: "In setting out to expound the ancient laws, it has seemed right
as of course to go back to the founding of the city for my account of the law
of the Roman people, not because I would write needlessly verbose commentar-
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the need to reconsider problems that have already been ade-
quately solved.
The Roman law, it appears, was the first to recognize
rights in airspace. Landowners were given control of the
area over their land at low altitudes as shown by "rustic
servitudes," which permitted them to remove branches over-
hanging cultivated land to a height of fifteen feet." This
was the law as expressed by Ulpian,'2 and it shows a landown-
er's right in airspace, as well as a limitation thereof. A rea-
son advanced for this limitation of fifteen feet over culti-
vated fields is that the fruitful use of the ground requires
sunshine for growing crops which might otherwise be harm-
fully shaded by low branches. 3 Another example of air-
space rights of landowners is .to be found in "urban servi-
tudes," which is the right of a landowner to have all branches
of a tree growing on neighboring land removed which over-
hang his house.' 4 This servitude would even allow the tree
to be felled. No express reason for the difference in the two
situations has been given, but it is submitted that these were
not two unrelated rules, but rather two applications of the
single principle that a landowner has the right of freedom
from interference by others with his lawful enjoyment of
his land for the use to which the land has been put. Clearly
this is the reason for the cultivated land servitude. Experi-
ence demonstrates the inadvisability of tree branches over-
hanging a house or extending near it, because of the danger
to the house from severe storms, winds, and lightning, as
well as the deleterious effects on the roof resulting from the
ies but because I notice that in all that matters a thing is perfect only when it is
complete in all its parts, and certainly the beginning is the most essential part
of anything. Moreover, if it is monstrous, as it were, for one who is arguing a
cause in the forum to lay out his case to the judge without some preliminary
statement, how much more is it unsuitable for one who expounds to disregard
the beginning and omit historical causes and take up the subject matter to be
expounded, if one may say so, at once with unwashed bands."
11 Lardone, supra note 2.
12 Bouve, supra note 2.
Is Lardone, supra note 2.
14 Ibid.
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accumulation and decay of branches, leaves, or needles on
it. These reasons might have seemed so obvious to the
Romans as not to warrant expression or recordation, while
the more specific limitation of a fifteen foot rustic servitude
required an explanation. However, differences between the
two rules have been suggested, and the urban servitude has
been thought to be the source of the maxim Cujus est.solum,
ejus est. usque ad coelum et ad inferos. Whose ground it is,
his it is to the sky and to the depths.15
Was this maxim a part of the Roman law? The authori-
ties do not think so. Pufendorf believed that the Roman
law held that a landowner had no property in air over which
he did not exercise dominion, that is, such space as he had
not occupied or confined. 6 Bouv6 concludes that in the Ro-
man law the essence of ownership was occupancy which was
dominion over the res. This involved the conception of di-
mensions which would preclude ownership of the air itself
although it would allow the occupancy and consequent own-
ership of a volume of air.'7 Sweeney has cited several
glosses, the Digest VIII of Ulpian, and the Code of Justinian
III, as showing that the airspace of the Cujus est solum
maxim was understood to be the height of a building or other
terrestrial structure.' Lardone has suggested that if the
maxim actually was Roman law, and air navigation had ex-
isted at that time, the law could have provided for the use
of a special air channel or even provided the right ". . . to
cross a private air column, when it was not used by the land-
owner himself, and provided such a crossing did not cause
injury or damage to persons or to property." '9 Actually,
rights to airspace at higher altitudes were not tested because
of its early non-use, so that no comparison can be made ex-
15 Ibid.
16 Bouve, supra note 2.
17 Ibid. This conclusion is developed in the article.
18 Sweeney, supra note 8, at 385.
19 Lardone, supra note 2, at 467.
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cept as to trees, eaves, or possibly the traverse of projectiles
or the flight of birds, which all are at low altitudes.
There is much speculation regarding the origin and actual
application of the maxim. But it seems to have been accept-
ed by English judges as far back as the time of Edward 1.20
Most modern publicists agree that it was not in the Corpus
Juris, and that it originated with a glossator on Justinian's
Digest named Accursius, whose son went from Bologna to
England to teach law at Oxford at the request of Edward I.
It is contended that the English judges adopted the father's
theory because of the son's favored position with the king.
Sohm set the date of the gloss at about 1250,21 while Lupton
estimates it to be around 1200.22 Montmorency states that
a careful research from the Twelve Tables to the Basilica
disclosed no reference to such a law. 3
According to Lupton the maxim was a part of the com-
mon law-a landowner could "exercise dominion over his
freehold to the skies above and to the center of the earth
below." 24 This apparently is based on Blackstone's state-
ment that: 25
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite ex-
tent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum .. .so that the word "land" includes not
only the face of the earth, but everything under it, or over it.
Lupton further states that: 2 "Blackstone infers that in-
jury to the air above one's land would give rise to a cause
of action as surely as if the injury were to the land itself."
But Blackstone was not always careful in citing his annota-
tions or in stating principles of law according to his citations.
20 See Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. EUz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1588).
21 See Bouve, supra note 2, at 247.
22 See Luprox, op. cit. supra note 7, § 40.
23 See Bouve, supra note 2, at 243.
24 LuPToN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 37.
25 2 BL. Comm. *18.
26 Lup-roNr, op. cit. supra note 7, § 41.
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As authority for his statement of the common law above, he
cited Lord Coke (circa 1628) on Littleton where it was
said: 27
And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards,
... but of air and all other things even up to heaven; for
cujus est as is holden 14 H. 8 fo. 12.22 H. 6.59. 10 E.
4.14.
Yet none of the cases cited refer to the maxim, although the
case at 22 Hen. VI Fol. 59 is interesting, as it concerned the
use of goshawks which can be compared to hunting from
planes which now generally is barred by statute.
The maxim first appeared in an English case in 1588,2"
again in 1597,29 and in 1610.10 An interesting decision in
which the court resorted to it is Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co.31
There a stallion bit and kicked a mare on the other side of a
boundary fence. A trespass was found even though the evi-
dence showed that the attacking horse had not touched the
ground across the line. This case, however, is readily dis-
tinguishable from air flight "trespasses."
The maxim was not fully accepted by continental law,
even before the time of air travel. Bouv6 states that "Von
1hering limits private rights in the supervening airspace to
boundaries necessary to the full enjoyment of the uses to
which the land is put"; and that Pompaloni holds that
"Property in airspace ... extends to the point which the in-
terests of the owner demand . ,, 32 On the other hand,
article 522 of the French Civil Code 11 seems to embrace the
maxim, but this article became law before the origins of air
travel; consequently it is believed that it cannot be accepted
without qualification for modern conditions. 4
27 2 Co. INST. *198.
28 Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. Ellz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1588).
29 Penruddock's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 1ob, 77 Eng. Rep. 210 (1598).
30 Baten's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 53b, 77 Eng. Rep. 810 (1610).
31 L. R. 10 C. P. 10 (1874).
32 Bouve, supra note 2, at 386, 387.
33 As cited in id. at 383.
34 Id. at 385.
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The maxim should not be accepted as law today, even if
it were the law at the time of the Accursian gloss, for law
must adapt itself to. the times, as to matters which are
neither contrary to nor demanded by the natural law. As
to these indifferent situations, the predominating social in-
terests of the time must be used to provide a living rule
which will not be the will of the dead who know not the pres-
ent times. 5 More recent non-air travel decisions may indi-
cate a sound basis for deciding problems of air flight. These
decisions will have to be resorted to until such time as an
adequate body of air flight law has arisen, or until the ques-
tions are answered by legislation.
II.
Relatively Recent Non-Aviation Airspace Rights
A. Physical Penetrations of Airspace:
Relatively recent decisions involving airspace rights prior
to the general use of aircraft reveal a respect for the rights
of the surface owner in the use and enjoyment of the super-
jacent space.
Relatively Permanent or Stationary Airspace Invasions-
Space displacement by relatively stationary invasions of the
airspace above the land of another is illustrated by Corbett
v. Hill,36 where a first floor window overhanging the neigh-
bor's land was held to be a trespass. The more recent case
of Gifford v. Dent " has sustained the right to normal use
and enjoyment of the superjacent airspace by the surface
occupant. In this case, it was held that a second floor hang-
ing sign was a trespass on the rights of the occupants of the
first floor.
Rhyne has concluded that the American non-aviation
cases accept the cujus est solum maxim and characterize the
35 POUND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13.
36 L. R. 9 Eq. 671 (1870).
37 71 SoL. J. 83 (1926).
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airspace invasions as trespasses.3 8 A review of these cases
has caused this writer to doubt whether they fully sustain
this conclusion. They more correctly may be said to main-
tain the rights of the surface owner to the normal use and
peaceful enjoyment of the surface by protecting it from
superjacent invasions; this partakes of a nuisance rather
than a trespass theory.
A common type of permanent displacement is illustrated
by the overhanging branch cases. Among these is Country-
man v. Lightkill,39 in which it was held that although over-
hanging branches of a non-poisonous, non-noxious tree are
not a nuisance per se, they may be trimmed back to the
property line, especially where the tree owner has been asked
to do so and has either refused or failed to comply with the
request. A clarification and amplification of this rule is giv-
en in Grandona v. Lovdal, in which the court quoting Wood,
Nuisances § 112 stated: 40 "'Trees whose branches extend
over the land of another are not nuisances, except to the
extent to which the branches overhang the adjoining land.
To that extent they are nuisances. . . .'" and may be cut
off or damages had, but the tree cannot be cut down. Like-
wise, protruding roots may be abated. This rule manifests
that the court was more inclined to protect the surface own-
er against infringement of the enjoyment and use of his land
by abatement of a nuisance than by absolute protection
against trespass.
The trespass theory is sustained by some cases, such as in
Hooper v. Herald,4 where a fence placed on another's land
which deprived the owner of the use of the space above the
38 RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS 98 (1944). Rhyne lists a number of
cases involving projections across another's land, thereby disturbing the owner's
peaceful enjoyment: thrusting arm in a belligerent manner over neighbor's land;
telephone wires, 30 feet in air over another's land; telephone pole crossarms over
private land; projecting eaves and cornices; bay window over adjacent lot; and
projection of dividing wall.
39 24 Hun 405 (N. Y. 1881).
40 70 Cal. 161, 11 Pac. 623, 624 (1886).
41 154 Mich. 529, 118 N. W. 3 (1908).
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land was held to be a trespass. This, however, must be rec-
ognized as also a direct invasion of the land. A slight vari-
ation of this was deemed a trespass in Public Service Co. of
Northern Illinois v. McCloskey,42 in which a power line was
erected on poles unintentionally placed on property without
the owner's consent. The owner was held to have the right
to prevent entrance of repairmen to repair a broken wire.
But here again the trespass was the poles on the land itself.
In Puroto v. Chieppa 3 it was also held that the projection
of a flash board one inch over a boundary line was a trespass
which entitled the landowner to nominal damages.
Relatively Transitory or Temporary Airspace Displace-
ments.-Similar reasoning as to existence of the right to
peaceful enjoyment of the land generally may be found in
cases involving the infringement of the landowner's rights
by transitory or temporary displacement of space above his
land. In Prewitt v. Clayton, the court stated: 44
A personal bodily entry upon the land is not necessary to
constitute a trespass quare clausmm fregit. One who stands
upon his own land, and with force and arms, by throwing
stones and clubs, breaks his neighbor's house, is guilty of tres-
pass quare clusum [sic] fregit.
Here again, the passage of the brickbats was a displacement
of the airspace, but the actual damage, other than nominal
amounts for the displacement, was to the enjoyment of the
real property, the landowner's house.
A clearer case is Munro v. Williams,5 where boys against
protests, persisted in firing air rifles onto another's land until
one of the shots put out a caretaker's eye. The court said
in part: 16 "Though standing on adjacent land the boys, in
shooting onto the respondent's land, were trespassers ... "
Similarly, in Whittaker v. Stangvick17 and in Herrin v. Suth-
42 235 1H1. App. 387 (1925).
43 78 Conn. 401, 62 AtI. 664 (1905).
44 21 Ky. (S T. B. Mon. 4) 9, 10 (1827).
45 94 Conn. 377, 109 At. 129 (1920).
46 Ibid.
47 100 Minn. 386, 111 N. W. 295 (1907).
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erland,48 the shooting of wild fowl in a manner that caused
the shot or fowl to fall on another's land was held to be a
trespass. In Joos v. Illinois National Guard,49 the court
held that shooting across land so as to render its use danger-
ous, even though the passage of the shots was the uninten-
tional result of target practice on adjacent land, was an in-
vasion of the rights of the occupant of the land and would
be enjoined.
The previously mentioned case of the trespass by the belli-
cose horse 10 expresses the law in England regarding the
transitory displacement of airspace, and it is supported by a
similar decision concerning the same type of invasion. In
Clifton v. Bury,5 shooting across land in a manner which
makes the customary use of the land dangerous was action-
able, although the shooting was not a technical trespass.
At the turn of the century, some support was given the
maxim in Hannabalson v. Sessions, but it seems the court
adverted to the maxim for the purpose of admonishing the
parties and not as a basis for its decision, the determination
actually being founded on the right of the landowner to pre-
vent disturbances by his neighbor of his rightful use. The
court declared: 52
It is one of the oldest rules of property known to the law
that the title of the owner of the soil extends, not only down-
ward to the center of the earth, but upward usque ad coelum,
although it is, perhaps, doubtful whether owners as quarrel-
some as the parties in this case will ever enjoy the usufruct of
their property in the latter direction .... It was enough that
she thrust her hand or arm across the boundary to technic-
ally authorize the defendant to demand that she cease the in-
trusion, and to justify him in using reasonable and necessary
force required for the expulsion of so much of her person as
he found upon his side of the line....
48 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
49 257 III. 138, 100 N. E. 505 (1913).
50 Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 10 (1874). See text at note 31
supra.
51 4 T. L. R. 8 (1887).
52 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93, 95 (1902).
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The plaintiff had reached over a boundary fence to remove
a ladder the defendant had hung from a peg on his side of the
fence. The court found that the plaintiff had been guilty of
trespass when she reached over it.
An interesting case of a temporary invasion arose from the
operation of a threshing machine so near a residence as to
cause dust, smoke, and chaff to be blown into the house. An
actionable nuisance was found and damages were awarded
for the pollution of the atmosphere." This decision clearly
is an effort to secure the land occupant in his right to the
undisturbed use and enjoyment of his premises. It is par-
ticularly important as indicative of rules which are logically
applicable to the spraying or dusting of crops, and the sow-
ing of seed by plane; and dust, smoke, and exhaust fumes
which may exist in the vicinity of an airport.
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.54 provides further
evidence of the attitude of the courts to restrict lawful oc-
cupations to practices which will not cause harm to others.
In this case the court held that the question of whether the
use of property to carry on a lawful business which creates
smoke or noxious gases in excessive quantities amounts to a
nuisance depends upon the facts of each case. The general
locality, the priority of occupation, and whether the injury
is occasional or continuous must all be considered. Also, if
the business can be conducted without the nuisance, it will
be abated, even if the necessary changes result in greater ex-
pense. In the McCarty case, the emission of dense smoke
which blackened clothes hung out to dry was held a nuisance,
especially since the industry was established after the private
residence.
A more emphatic protection from this type of transitory
penetration of airspace is exhibited by Metropoulos v. Mac-
Pherson,55 in which a factory annex was built after a resi-
53 78 Ill. App. 417 (1898).
54 189 N. Y. 40, 81 N. E. 549 (1907).
55 Winters v. Winters, 241 Mass. 491, 135 N. E. 693 (1922).
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dence with its wall within a few inches of the house. Win-
dows in the factory faced the residence and noxious gases
and fumes were emitted toward the house, causing living to
become uncomfortable and the paint on the house to dis-
color. Damages for trespass were awarded and the con-
tinued emission of odors enjoined, even though a revised
ventilation system for the factory might be extremely ex-
pensive. This case also involved the second general type of
airspace displacement by the propagation of noise and vi-
bration by machinery. At times, the windows, dishes, and
tableware would rattle, and even the furniture would vibrate
in the house. This, the court held to be an invasion of the
right to normal use and peaceful enjoyment of the property,
which would be'abated as an unwarranted nuisance, even
though the business was of a lawful nature and although re-
location of the factory machinery would be expensive.
Thus, even invisible penetrations of the airspace may be
actionable nuisances. Seacord v. People 56 illustrates this
type of invasion by a transitory condition, which, while
invisible, was an actual physical displacement of air. In
this instance, the conduct of a lawful business, that of oper-
ating a rendering plant was held not a nuisance per se, but
the operation of the enterprise was found to pollute need-
lessly the neighboring atmosphere. Fetid breezes caused
by the outdoor storage of putrefying carcasses were found
to amount to a criminal nuisance.
B. Atmospheric Disturbances and Energy Penetrations of
Airspace:
The problem of the second type of airspace penetration is
more difficult to resolve, for it involves no actual physical
entrance, yet it may just as certainly deprive the surface
owner of the normal and peaceful use and enjoyment of
56 121 II, 623, 13 N. E. 194 (1887).
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his property. Noise, concussions, and vibrations are the
chief sources of nuisances of this type.
There are many cases on the injuries that have resulted
from blasting operations. Without considering the liability
for the hurling of debris upon another's land, the general
rule is that blasting on one's own land, if necessary for its
improvement, and not negligently done, does not make one
liable for consequential damages from vibration. 7 Never-
theless, it has been said that if an excavation could have
been made without blasting or with a less violent explosive
than the one used, liability would attach for consequential
damages from concussions and vibrations, on the ground
that the actual performance amounted to negligence." This
rule has been applied to one otherwise blasting with due care
on his own soil, where the explosion broke windows, loosened
walls, and damaged furniture. The concussion was held to
be an actionable nuisance. 9 The general rule has been well
expressed in Sullivan v. Dunham '0 as follows:
When the injury is not direct, but consequential, such as
is caused by concussion, which ... injures property, there is
no liability, in the absence of negligence. . . . "One cannot
confine the vibration of the earth or air within enclosed limits,
and hence it must follow that if, in any given case, they are
rightfully caused, their extension to their ultimate and natural
limits cannot be unlawful, and the consequential injury, if any,
must be remediless."
A similar conclusion was reached in New York Steam Co. v.
Foundation Co. although the case was reversed on appeal.61
The attempt to determine the scope of "due care" pre-
sents difficulty in all vibration cases. In McKeon v. See,6"
57 Stancourt Laundry Co. v. Lamura, 147 N. Y. Supp. 895 (N. Y. City Ct.
1914).
58 Booth v. Rome, W. & O. T. R.R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893).
59 Morgan et al. v. Bowes et al., 62 Hun 623, 17 N. Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct.
1891).
60 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923, 925 (1900).
61 123 App. Div. 254, 108 N. Y. Supp. 84 (lst Dep't 1908), rev'd, 195 N. Y.
43, 87 N. E. 765 (1909).
62 27 Super. (4 Rob.) 449 (1867), aff'd, 51 N. Y. 300 (1873).
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not involving blasting, it was held that the operation of
steampower on adjoining property, which caused injury to
the neighbor's house by continuous jarring and vibration
would be enjoined as a nuisance. Similarly, carrying on a
lawful trade in a manner which causes tremendous vibra-
tions, shaking dishes and walls, and also the emission of
dense smoke polluting the atmosphere has been held to be
an actionable nuisance, even without a showing of negli:
gence in the operation of the business.63 In Forbell v. City
of New York, the court said: 6 "No doubt trespass may be
committed by the projection of force beyond the boundary
of the lot where the projecting instrument is operated." It
should be noted however, that it has been decided that a
person cannot recover for annoyance caused by noise and
vibration from the public use of a street by ordinary traffic
or from the operation of a street railway by a public service
company.65 This was explained in Stevens v. Rockport
Granite Co.,66 where the court said: "
In order that a noise may amount to a nuisance, it must
be harmful to the health or comfort of ordinary people. It
is not enough that a person of peculiar temperament, unusual
sensibilities or weakened physical condition, may be affected.
... The pertinent inquiry is whether the noise materially in-
terferes with the physical comfort of existence, not according
to exceptionally refined, uncommon, or luxurious habits of liv-
ing, but according to the simple tastes and unaffected notions
generally prevailing among plain people.
This does not mean that unnecessary or particularly dis-
turbing noises are allowed, even in the performance of a
lawful business. The loading of dairy trucks between three
and four o'clock in the morning and the running of an ice
63 Hurlbut v. McKone et al., 55 Conn. 31, 10 At. 164 (1887).
64 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644, 646 (1900).
65 State ex rel. Howard v. Hartford Street Ry., 76 Conn. 174, 56 Atl. 506
(1903).
66 216 Mass. 486, 104 N. E. 371 (1914).
67 Id., 104 N. E. at 373.
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crusher at night may be of such "character and volume as
to constitute a private nuisance when occurring during the
hours usually devoted to sleep, even though the same or
more distracting ones would not be so held at other
times .... ,, 68 This is a practical illustration of a general
principle of law, that one's own property must be used so as
not to injure the property of another or the reasonable en-
joyment of it. It has been held that "a trade or business
which creates distressing noises or vibrations," as by the
operation of ice machinery, "rendering the occupation of
property in the vicinity unsafe and uncomfortable is a nui-
sance, for which the person whose property is damaged may
maintain an action and recover compensation for any in-
jury." 69  In like manner, the making of unnecessary and
disturbing loud noises, which injure health and business, con-
stitutes a trespass." Thus, the inherent noise-producing
property of modern aircraft has various aspects depending
upon the operations, such as the altitude of flight, the loca-
tion of hangars, possibly the layout of the airfield, the sched-
ule or custom of take-offs and landings, the possibility of
using mufflers of various types, and similar aspects which
bear upon the reasonableness of the aircraft operations.
A problem related to intangible invasions of airspace is
freedom from violation of the right to privacy. This right,
which is given substantial protection in the United States,
can be affected by the use of slow flying and hovering air-
craft. Whether an infringement on the right to privacy also
amounts to a trespass is answered by the rule: ". . . that the
eye cannot be a trespasser. .. unless the person looking...
is, at the time of the.., seeing, a trespasser." ' One writer
68 Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 200 N. W. 350,
352 (1924).
69 Cunningham et al. v. Wilmington Ice Mfg. Co. et al., 2 Harr. 229, 121
Atl. 654 (Del. 1923).
70 Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S. W. 1005 (1905).
71 Goode v. State, 158 Miss. 616, 131 So. 106, 108 (1930).
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has envisioned more problems arising out of this situation
in warmer climates. 2
Light energy becomes a problem where landing lights at
an airport create such an invasion of adjoining airspace as
to become a nuisance." A non-aeronautical case of space
penetration by a form of energy concerned the operation of
an icehouse with a wall only a few inches from an adjoining
house. In this case, the business was lawful and otherwise
exercised with all possible care. The infringement was that
the melting ice necessarily absorbed heat energy from ad-
joining space and created a very uncomfortable condition of
chill in the neighbor's house. The court held that the oper-
ator "either permits its injurious incidents and consequences
to invade the plaintiffs' property, or cannot prevent them.
She is liable for this injury." 7 This holding is significant
in that it may indicate a path of reasoning which future de-
cisions may follow in deciding issues of invasions by energy,
as for example, by excessive artificial lighting from airports.
Early aircraft and related problems were usually given
special leniency by the courts in order not to stifle a new and
promising activity, but now, with the establishment of aero-
nautics as a part of modern life, one can expect a more
strict application of the customary rules of law to it. What
shall now be examined is how the courts have applied the
rules of airspace trespass and nuisance to this new branch
of the law, and to consider the statutory measures that have




72 LoGAN, AmcRAFT LAW: MADE PLA3N 22 (1928), states: "In this country
the right of privacy is usually well preserved by one's roof, but in climates where
the intimate details of domestic life are carried on in an open, but privately sur-
rounded, patio or courtyard, the point is well taken."
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73 Antonik et al. v. Chamberlain et al., 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N. E. (2d)
752 (1947). "
74 Barrick et al. v. Schifferdicker, 48 Hun 355, 1 N. Y. Supp. 21, 23 (Sup.
Ct. 1888).
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